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Interaction Between Food 
Attributes in Markets: The Case 
of Environmental Labeling 
Gilles Grolleau and Julie A. Caswell 
Some consumers derive utility from using products produced with specific processes, 
such as environmentally friendly practices. Means of verifying these credence 
attributes, such as certification, are necessary for the market to function effectively. 
A substitute or complementary solution may exist when consumers perceive a 
relationship between a process attribute and other verifiable product attributes. We 
present a model where the level of search and experience attributes influences the 
likelihood of production of eco-friendly products. Our results suggest that the market 
success of eco-friendly food products requires a mix of environmental and other 
verifiable attributes that together signal credibility. 
Key words: environmental labeling, food attributes, foodmarketing, quality perception 
Introduction 
Some consumers derive utility from buying and using food products produced under 
specific processes, such as environmentally friendly practices. Means ofverifying the use 
of these practices are frequently necessary in order for markets to function efficiently 
and without fraud because consumers cannot evaluate whether particular practices were 
used. Analysis of eco-labeling has focused to a large extent on the operation of markets 
for environmental attributes without adequately addressing the total food product. 
Our analysis differs by treating eco-friendliness as a component of a product's overall 
quality rather than as a stand-alone attribute. Some papers have already suggested that 
eco-certification requires minimum quality standards to command a price premium 
(Thompson and Kidwell, 1998; Lohr, 1998) but consider these minimum standards as 
conditions for market access. In contrast, we consider them as informational instruments 
that determine, at  least partially, the credibility of environmental claims in consumers' 
minds. The types and levels of search and experience attributes required by minimum 
quality standards may not correspond to those consumers use to infer the credibility of 
environmental claims. We explore the extent to which the importance and credibility of 
environmental claims interact with a product's other quality attributes in determining 
the likelihood of success in marketing eco-friendly food products. 
If consumers perceive a correlation between a process attribute, such as eco-friendli- 
ness, and other product attributes they can evaluate, the quality levels of such supporting 
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supporting attributes can be a substitute for or complement to direct verification of 
environmental attributes. Verifiable attributes that can be inspected for before purchase 
or evaluated after use can support the credibility of the process claim, without strictly 
proving its truthfulness. Similarly, the credibility of an eco-friendly claim can be dam- 
aged by a failure to provide adequate levels of other verifiable attributes. Our results 
suggest the market success of environmentally friendly food products requires a mix of 
environmental and other verifiable attributes that together signal credibility. 
An Overview 
of Quality Perception and Assurance 
Understanding of the operation of markets for food, and food attributes, has evolved 
greatly based on analysis of the information environment available to consumers. 
Consumers' perception of quality is influenced by the product's intrinsic attributes as 
well as by extrinsic indicators and cues provided by the seller of the product. Intrinsic 
attributes relate to a broad array of attributes including food safety, nutrition, conven- 
ience, composition, and process attributes such as eco-friendliness (Caswell, Noelke, and 
Mojduszka, 2002). The information environment for different intrinsic attributes may 
be search, experience, or credence in nature (Akerlof, 1970; Nelson, 1970; Darby and 
Karni, 1973): the consumer can learn about the quality level prior to purchase (search), 
after purchase and use (experience), or not at all (credence). Extrinsic indicators (e.g., 
certification, labeling) and cues (e.g., brand name, packaging, price) convey search 
information to the consumer since they are available prior to purchase (Steenkamp, 
1989). The consumer's perception of quality is formed from a blend of information from 
these multiple sources. 
Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) argue that an experience or credence attribute can be 
transformed into a search attribute via labeling. More generally, however, an attribute 
can switch among the categories of search, experience, and credence based on trans- 
action conditions, including the use of extrinsic indicators and cues, the technology of 
testing and labeling, and the benefits and costs of information acquisition for buyers. 
Figure 1 illustrates such transformations. For instance, mandatory labeling can change 
an a priori credence characteristic such as use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
into a search characteristic. Opaque packaging changes a search attribute such as color 
into an experience attribute. The transformation of an attribute is sometimes the result 
of changes in the food distribution system. For example, long, global supply chains may 
make origin and production practices less transparent to consumers in the absence of 
traceability and labeling. 
The analysis ofwhether the market will deliver products with different quality levels, 
particularly higher quality, has also been anchored in the context of the information 
environment (see, e.g., Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970; Lancaster, 1996). Problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard can occur where important product attributes are experience 
or credence in nature. Adverse selection is ex ante opportunism due to hidden informa- 
tion. It  could occur, for example, where some producers provide false labeling about 
environmental attributes and underlying production practices causing consumers to 
choose products that do not have the attributes they want. Moral hazard is ex post 
opportunism due to hidden action. In quality assurance, a moral hazard situation arises 
when the producer is tempted to not carry out all the practices necessary to achieve a 
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Search attributes 
Experience 
I attributes 1 attributes 
GMO o Better taste or preservation attributed to a GMO 
Figure 1. Examples of switching of attributes among search, 
experience, and credence categories 
certain quality level because the consumer cannot or finds it difficult to check whether 
the actions have been taken. 
In cases of both adverse selection and moral hazard, the market will not fully reward 
high quality producers or adequately punish low quality producers. While moral hazard 
is a real issue in environmental certification, it may be mitigated to some extent by the 
need for producers to make significant initial investments in knowledge, skills, mater- 
ials, and time to become certified. Indeed, acquiring and assimilating environmental 
abilities implies initial sunk costs and can be considered as a choice made once and for 
all [see Rogerson (1983) for a similar hypothesis]. Once acquired, these abilities can 
generate a kind of "self lock-in," partly due to a win-win-win strategy, i.e., a win for the 
firm, the consumer, and the environment. We focus here on the consumer end of the 
market where adverse selection, of the type first analyzed by Akerlof (1970), remains 
a significant problem. 
Several mechanisms, such as reputation, efficient quality signaling, advertising, and 
government standards, can mitigate adverse selection generated by experience goods 
(Nelson, 1970; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Kirmani and Rao, 
2000). Credence attributes, such as environmental friendliness, pose more problems in 
markets because the cost of defining, measuring, and verifying them can be high, along 
with the temptation to cheat. A potential remedy to the measurement problem is to use 
a proxy or a signal. Efficient measurement will be undertaken by that party to the 
exchange who has easy access to information and lower costs of measurement, provided 
incentives to cheat are curbed and trust is established (Eggertsson, 1999; Barzel, 1982). 
For example, because safety output may be too costly to measure (e.g., the absence of 
pesticide residues), it may be more cost-effective to measure management practices (e.g., 
organic farming) instead of the final product characteristics. At the end of the food 
chain, consumers can search for the organic label, which is a signal for the proxy, and 
thereby avoid excessive transaction costs in finding and evaluating products. Of course, 
the proxy and signal may convey information about multiple attributes. 
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Ensuring the credible operation of markets for credence attributes may require external 
intervention to allow consumers to choose products that correspond to their preferences 
and for honest producers to credibly signal their products. Macho-Stadtler and Perez- 
Castrillo (2001) suggest sufficient conditions for a market for credence attributes to 
function effectively (i.e., for a separating equilibrium to exist), allowing eco-friendly 
producers to label their products at a non-prohibitive cost. Specifically: (a) eco-friendly 
producers can acquire the eco-seal a t  a lower cost than conventional producers; (b) for 
eco-friendly producers, the expected profit with an eco-seal minus the cost of acquiring 
the signal is greater than the profit without the eco-seal; and (c) for conventional pro- 
ducers, the expected profit with an eco-seal minus the cost of acquiring the signal is less 
than the profit without the eco-seal. 
If successful in designing and supporting the costs of signaling through a labeling 
program, eco-friendly producers transform a credence attribute into a search attribute 
where consumers can make successful selections based on reliable information. In other 
cases, governmental intervention or credible third-party intervention may be needed to 
mitigate market failure and guarantee fair trading (McCluskey, 2000). 
Even though information about credence characteristics may be disclosed, consumers 
may have difficulty in processing it because of time constraints or a lack of specific skills. 
Eco-label design matters because of these information problems. For example, Wynne 
(1994) shows that environmental report cards (graphical presentation of environmental 
performance without value judgments) establish symmetrical but useless information 
for consumers who lack expertise and time to process them. Well-designed eco-labels can 
serve as cognitive supports that economize on the attention of consumers and on trans- 
action costs (Valceschini, 1999; Wynne, 1994). 
Overall, in many cases market mechanisms can be self-enforcing for both search and 
experience attributes, while credence attributes may require an increased level of 
external intervention in order for markets for quality to function effectively. Here we 
focus on the implications for the marketing of eco-friendly products of consumer 
perception of interactions among the search, experience, and credence attributes of 
food products. 
A Model of Interaction Between Product 
Attributes in Determining the Likelihood 
of Eco-Friendly Production 
Consider the case of a consumer willing to promote environmentally friendly practices 
in farming and processing by buying credibly eco-labeled food products. In line with 
Lancaster's (1966) framework, the consumer's utility from consuming an eco-labeled 
product is not determined by the product itself but by the bundle of characteristics the 
product provides. Here these characteristics are both the credence environmental 
characteristics and the product's related search and experience characteristics. 
To model the choice between two products, assume the typical consumer derives utility 
from: (a) consuming the two bundles of characteristics embodied in the two goods-a 
conventionally produced product X that does not carry eco-labeling at  a price P, and a 
product with enhanced environmental features X' that is eco-labeled at  a price P'; and 
(b) consuming the quality of the environment Q. 
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Several factors play a role in the consumer's utility: 
The utility resulting from the consumption of the experience and search attributes 
of X or X', i.e., aUlaX versus aUlaX'. Most generally, (dUIaX1 - aUlaX) could be 
positive, zero, or negative. 
The environmental improvement resulting fromXor X', i.e., dQ16Xversus aQ16X'. 
The utility resulting from the environmental improvement, i.e., aUlaQ. 
Assume that utility increases with consuming the productsX(aU1aX > 0) orX' (aUlaX' 
> 01, and enjoying the environment (auld& > 0). As noted above, the eco-labeled product 
could have related search and experience characteristics that are better or worse than 
the conventional product. XandX' are both harmful to the environment (aQlaXc 0 and 
aQlaX1 c O), but the eco-labeled product (X') is less harmful than the conventional one 
(X). The quality of the environment Q is decreasing withXandX' but more slowly with 
X' than with X, so that aQlaX 2 aQlaX' 0. The environmental improvement with X' 
is aQldX' - aQldX. Because of differences in related search and experience character- 
istics, the expected utility from consuming an eco-labeled product could be higher than 
caulax > aulax), the same as caulax = a u ~ a x ) ,  or less than ( ~ u I ~ x '  c au~ax) the 
expected utility from consuming a conventional product. 
Under these assumptions, the consumer's problem is to: 
Max U(X, X', Q(X, X' 1) 
s.t.: PX + P'X' = I ,  
where U is a quasi-concave utility function and I is consumer income spent on goods X 
and X'. The Lagrangian function is written as: 
(2) F(X, x', Q, a) = U(X, x', Q(X, x')) + (I - P *X - PI *x')A, 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier. The partial derivatives are: 
(4) 
and 
(5) 
Rearranging the previous equations, we obtain: 
If (aU/dX1) - (aUlaX) > 0 and dU1dQ * (aQ/dX' - dQlaX) > 0, then P'> P as consumers 
are willing to pay a price premium (a) for an eco-labeled good: 
(7) a = PI - P = [caulax - aulax) + aula~ * ( a ~ i a x  - a ~ i a x ) ] / a ,  
with 
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Assume a perfectly competitive market where producers who take the environmental 
impacts of production into account incur higher production (and transaction) costs. Here 
the marginal production cost ofX', C,(X'), is greater than that ofX, C,(X). Competitive 
producers adopt the eco-friendly process if the difference between the marginal costs of 
the two products is strictly less than a, i.e., the marginal value of the utility resulting 
from the environmental improvement of the last unit (aUlaQ * (aQlaX' - aQlaX)) plus 
the marginal utility resulting from the increase of related search and experience 
attributes of the last unit (aUlaX' - aUlaX). In addition to the marginal costs, environ- 
mentally friendly production frequently entails sunk costs (e.g., specific equipment, 
training, certification, and advertising) requiring marginal costs to be further below a 
to induce production. 
If C,(X') - C,(X) > a,  the price of the eco-labeled product would be too high and the 
consumer would only consume the conventional product X. If C,W) - C,(X) < a, then 
the price fixed by the eco-friendly producer would be low enough that the eco-friendly 
producer captures the whole demand and there is no demand for X. Finally, if C,(X') - 
C,(X) = a, the consumer could be indifferent between consuming the two goods. 
Nevertheless, rational consumers may always prefer buying an eco-labeled product. 
Such a rationale is consistent with Andreoni's (1990) arguments that people may volun- 
tarily contribute to a public good due to what he calls impure altruism. The consumer 
derives utility from both purchasing the eco-labeled product (referred to as "warm glow" 
by Andreoni) and from the public good in question, i.e., the increased environmental 
quality. 
The likelihood of producing an eco-labeled good and bearing the subsequent extra 
costs depends on the value of a, which is shaped by consumer preferences. Table 1 shows 
several cases related to the interaction of different types of attributes. First, consider 
the situation shown in row B where the level of related search and experience attributes 
of the two products is equivalent (aUlaX' - aUlaXis zero) and the exclusive focus is on 
the effect of eco-characteristics (aUlaQ * (aQlaX1 - aQlaX)). This is the situation analyzed 
in most discussions of eco-labeling where attribute interactions are ignored. There are 
four cases: 
Cell B1. Producing the eco-labeled item generates a high environmental improve- 
ment, and consumers value it highly. The overall impact on a is significant, and 
producers will be likely to produce the eco-labeled product. 
Cell B2. Producing the eco-labeled item has a low impact on environmental quality, 
but consumers value this small impact highly. The overall impact on a is signifi- 
cant, and producers may be likely to produce the eco-labeled product even though 
the overall environmental improvement is modest. 
Cell B3. The environmental improvement resulting from producing the eco-labeled 
product is high, but consumers place a low value on this change in environmental 
quality. The overall impact on a is weak. Producing an eco-labeled product can im- 
prove environmental quality significantly, but the producer is not willing to do so. 
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Table 1. Likelihood of Eco-Friendly Production for Different Levels of Search, 
1 high I high 
Experience, and Environmental Attributes 
(aUlaX' - aUlaX) > 0 Likely to produce 
(+++I 
4 1 
C (aU/aX' - aU/aX) < 0 Indeterminate Unlikely to produce I I (+I-) (---I  
B 
Cell B4. Producing the eco-labeled item generates a small environmental improve- 
ment, but consumers do not value the improvement. The overall impact on a is 
insignificant, and producers will be unlikely to produce the eco-labeled products. 
2 
Second is the situation where the level of related search and experience attributes of 
the eco-friendly product is higher than that of the conventional product (dUldX' - dUldX 
is positive). In all four cases (cells A1-A4), the higher level of related search and experi- 
ence attributes for the eco-friendly product has a positive impact on the likelihood that 
eco-labeled products will be produced compared to the base case of no difference in these 
attributes (cells B1-B4). Of particular interest is cell A4. If both the effect of the environ- 
mental improvement (dQldX' - dQldX) and the valuation of the improvement (dUldQ) are 
low or close to zero, the marginally eco-friendly product may still be produced if the search 
and experience attributes are significantly better than for the conventional product. 
Third is the situation where (dUldX' - dUldX) is negative, i.e., the level of related 
search and experience attributes of the eco-friendly product is significantly lower than 
for the corresponding conventional product. In all cases (cells C1-C4), the lower level 
of related search and experience attributes for the eco-friendly product has a negative 
impact on the likelihood it will be produced compared to the base case of no difference 
in search and experience attributes (cells B1-B4). 
Cell C1 is an indeterminate case in terms of whether the eco-friendly product will be 
produced. The combined effect of a high environmental improvement (dQldX' - dQldX) 
and the high valuation of the improvement (dUldQ) is likely to encourage the production 
of the eco-friendly product. However, the lower level of related search and experience 
characteristics is likely to discourage such production. The stronger effect determines 
whether the eco-friendly product is produced. 
Overall, the scenarios presented in table 1 suggest the impact of different levels of 
related search and experience attributes on the likelihood of production of eco-friendly 
products, in cases where this production has different environmental effects and these 
effects are valued at varying levels by consumers. Within different levels of consumer 
valuation, eco-friendly production and marketing will be more likely where the search 
and experience attributes of eco-friendly products are superior to those of conventional 
products. 
3 
(aUlaX' - aUlaX) = 0 Likely to produce 
(+ +) 
Likely to produce 
(+) 
Unlikely to produce 
(- 1 
Unlikely to produce 
(--I 
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When Search and Experience Attributes 
Are Used as Indicators of Credence Attributes 
The effect on the likelihood of eco-friendly production and marketing of the interaction 
among search, experience, and credence attributes may be intensified where consumers 
use search and experience attributes as indicators of credence attributes. Products are 
bundles of attributes and, in real markets, information on some may serve as indicators 
of the quality of others. Similarly, extrinsic indicators (e.g., certification, labeling) and 
cues (e.g., brand name, packaging, price) can be used to provide signals about the level 
of intrinsic quality attributes. 
To market their products more effectively, producers may use the level of and infor- 
mation on search and experience attributes, which consumers can verify, to reinforce 
signaling about credence attributes. In a multi-attributelmulti-signal atmosphere, 
attributes and certification systems can reinforce or attenuate each other. As stressed 
by Armstrong and Rochet (1999), if consumers have preferences over more than one 
product attribute that a firm can control, then equilibrium requires solving a multi- 
dimensional screening problem. This has proven to be extremely challenging. 
We focus on how quality and information levels for search and experience attributes 
influence the consumer's evaluation of the credibility of an eco-seal, which signals the 
credence attribute of environmental friendliness. Figure 2 presents a simplified sequence 
for this interaction: 
Producers signal the credence attribute of environmental friendliness through use 
of an eco-seal of approval. The level of this credence attribute is a promise made by 
producers that is unverifiable by consumers. 
Consumers form expectations on the levels of search (e.g., less packaging) and 
experience (e.g., better taste) attributes of the product. 
Consumers assess the search and experience attributes by inspecting the product 
andlor buying and using it. 
Consumers find that (a )  the quality of the related search and experience attributes 
is greater than or equal to their expectations, or (b)  the quality of the related search 
and experience attributes is lower than their expectations. 
Consumers whose expectations are met project positive feedback onto the other 
promises made by the producer, e.g., the eco-friendly claim. Consumers whose 
expectations are not met project negative feedback (and distrust) onto other claims 
made by the producer, especially unverifiable ones such as the eco-label. 
The key links in the above sequence are the feedback loops connecting expectations 
and eventual product evaluation across quality attributes. These expectations and 
evaluations may not be scientifically proven and objective, as is documented in several 
empirical studies [North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), 
1999; Spmdergaard, 1999; Union Federale des Consommateurs, 19981. For example, CEC 
concluded the interest of Canadian, Mexican, and American consumers in shade grown 
coffee was most influenced by the perception that this type of coffee is superior in taste 
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(5) Consumers are satisfied and 
give more credence to the 
producer's signal 
A 
! Positive Feedback 
(4) The quality of the related search and 
experience attributes is greater than or 
equal to consumers' exoectations 
attributes (e.g.. eco-seal of 
approval) producer's signal 
Negative Feedback I 
lcvels of related search and 
Figure 2. Impact of search and experience attributes on the 
credibility of signaling for credence attributes 
I  . 
and quality. While related search and experience attributes may be imperfect (or per- 
haps very imperfect) indicators of the credibility of the credence signal, consumers will 
use them to form overall quality perceptions. 
The sequence shown in figure 2 can be enriched by introducing, as part of the evalu- 
ation process, the consumer's comparison of the search and experience attributes of the 
eco-labeled product to those of conventionally produced products. Using the notation 
developed in the previous section, suppose that consumers give credence to an eco- 
friendly claim if the difference in the search and experience attributes between the eco- 
friendly and conventional products is greater than or equal to an exogenous given level, 
U*, i.e., (aUlaX1 - aUlaX) 2 U*. The likelihood of buying an eco-friendly product (P,) can 
be expressed as: 
l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
where f(aUlaX1 - aulax) = 1 if caulax- aUlaX) 2 u*, and f(aUlaX1 - aUlaX) = 0 if 
(aUlaX' - aUli3X) < U*. The probability ( p ) ,  which describes the level of trust the con- 
sumer has in the relationship between the level of the search and experience attributes 
and the credibility of the eco-friendly claim, is a continuous function ranging from 0 (no 
trust) to 1 (complete trust). This probability can also be interpreted in the case of 
informed parties, such as public authorities or environmental activists, as the degree 
of scientific certainty about the relationship between the achievement of a particular 
level of related attributes and the achievement of the eco-friendly promise. 
Trust may be developed through different means that are not mutually exclusive, 
such as certification (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996; McCluskey, 2000), conspicuous 
expenditures on packaging and advertising (Nichols, 1998), and reputation-building 
strategies (McCluskey and Loureiro, 2005). For example, consumers who have previ- 
ously purchased products certified by specific third parties and been satisfied with the 
level ofrelated non-credence attributes may form trust in future transactions. Consumer 
trust may be based on a substantial past history or an established reputation (Shapiro, 
1982,1983; McCluskey and Loureiro, 2005). The marketing literature also shows that 
a producer may rent a reputation, when a seller without a brand reputation uses reputa- 
tion spillover to sell through a reputable seller (Chu and Chu, 1994). 
(3) Consumers assess the I  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - I  
search and experience attributes 
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Table 2. Likelihood of Buying an Eco-Friendly Product Based on Levels of 
Related Attributes and Consumer Trust in the Relationship to the Eco- 
Friendly Claim 
Level of Consumer Trust 
p = 1 (complete trust in  the relationship) Po = 1 
p = 0 (no trust in the relationship) Pe = 0 
Table 2 shows the polar cases for trust, recognizing that intermediate levels are 
possible (McCluskey and Loureiro, 2005) and may be a more realistic scenario. If 
consumers wholly trust the relationship ( p  = 1) and the eco-friendly product's search 
and experience attributes are high enough ((dUldX' - dUldX) U*), then they will trust 
the claim and buy the eco-friendly product. In the other three cases, the likelihood of 
purchasing an eco-friendly product is zero because (a)  consumers trust the relationship 
between the level of search and experience attributes and the credence claim, but the 
search and experience attributes are not high enough to lend support to the credence 
claim; or (b) there is no trust in the relationship between search and experience attri- 
butes and the environmental claim, regardless of whether the levels of search and 
experience attributes are high enough. In this simplified analytical framework, results 
for intermediate levels of trust are indeterminate. 
In addition to the relationships among search, experience, and credence attributes 
shown in table 2, consumers can make more complex connections. They can use infer- 
ences across attributes, extrinsic cues, and extrinsic indicators to evaluate attributes 
they cannot verify, especially when consumers make repeated purchases over time. 
Doing so reduces the consumer's information and transaction costs by serving as a 
substitute for expensive gathering and processing of complex information or acquiring 
costly information from disinterested third parties. For example, consumers commonly 
make inferences based on the extrinsic cue of price (Stiglitz, 1987; Bagwell and Riordan, 
1991). Consumers may distrust environmental claims on low-priced products because 
they perceive a dissonance between a low price and an environmental promise. 
Implications for Marketing Eco-Labeled Products 
Our analysis suggests there is a credibility area for eco-friendly food products that 
depends on how the attributes of a product are differentiated in a particular country or 
among particular market segments. The level of a product's environmental soundness 
or stewardship may be vertically differentiated-i.e., at  the same price and with iden- 
tical other attributes, all consumers would prefer the more environmentally sound 
product, although the degree to which this is the case may be weak among some 
consumers. The pattern of differentiation is complicated by the existence of a broad 
range of criteria for environmental friendliness. Other attributes may be differentiated 
vertically or horizontally (i.e., at  the same price and with identical other attributes, 
some consumers would prefer one quality level while others would prefer alternative 
levels). Environmental friendliness may not be the dominant driver in consumers' pro- 
duct choices, but instead be an additional and secondary consideration. 
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Environmental Attributes 
0 AC Search & Experience Attributes 
Figure 3. Credibility area for eco-friendly products in 
the attribute space 
Figure 3 shows a simplified two-dimensional attribute space for food products. The 
vertical axis indicates the level of environmental characteristics, while the horizontal 
axis indicates the level of search and experience attributes. To be certified to a 
particular eco-friendly standard at time t, a food product must have environmental 
characteristics with a minimum level A,. At the same time, to be credible to consumers, 
an eco-friendly food product may need to have quality levels for search and experience 
attributes at  least as high as A,, the level of these attributes necessary to lend credence 
to the eco-friendly claim. The credibility area for eco-friendly food products is the shaded 
space where (x, y )  E (A,, A,). From a conceptual point of view, all the products in this 
area could be successfully labeled and marketed as eco-friendly. At time t + 1, the A, and 
A, thresholds could move to correspond to new consumer requirements. 
The market success of an eco-friendly food product is closely linked to the shape and 
location of this credibility area and to a product's position within it. This takes into 
account environmental, search, and experience attributes. In a context where consumers 
have limited processing time and abilities, the credibility of environmental labeling is 
linked to the transaction environment. Consumer perceptions of these parameters can 
work together to mitigate or reinforce informational asymmetry and overload. We argue 
that a high enough level of search and experience attributes detectable by consumers 
before or after the purchase can support the credibility of environmental claims. 
How consumers make inferences between different types of attributes has important 
implications for the decisions ofproducers, marketers, and policy makers. To be success- 
ful, producers and marketers may not be able to rely only on third-party certification to 
ensure the credibility of their eco-claims. They may have to invest in the production of 
related search and experience attributes, even if consumer inferences based on them are 
subjective. The design of effective eco-labels must include a clear understanding of how 
consumers make inferences about the credibility of an environmental claim. 
An example is the Conservation Grade label developed in response to consumer 
demand for less intensively produced food. It is marketed in several European countries, 
including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France. It  promises consumers 
minimal use of agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuticals, optimum animal welfare 
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in food production, and that the farmer takes care ofwildlife environments. Certification 
standards are less strict than for organic foods. The standards are defined by a union 
of producers and monitored by independent inspectors. In France, several Jordans 
breakfast cereals (www.jordans.fr) carry the Conservation Grade symbol. The label text 
(translated from the French) explains that the Conservation Grade is: 
. . . both a label and a standard, defined in England where there are a lot of environmen- 
talists. It ensures that all products produced on farms respecting these specifications are 
farmed without chemical inputs leaving traces either in the soil or in the harvest. It 
means a double guarantee: an authentic taste and a better respect of the environment. 
The message conveyed by the label clearly links environmental protection and taste, 
encouraging the consumer to support the environmental credence claim by tasting the 
products. 
Concluding Remarks 
The analysis presented here explores several but not all aspects of the interaction of 
attributes and suggests several opportunities for research. For example, does the link- 
age by consumers of search, experience, and credence attributes improve or inhibit 
market performance? The heuristic procedures used by consumers may reduce trans- 
action costs and prevent the waste of resources on expensive monitoring. On the other 
hand, consumers' inferences about relationships between attribute levels may lead 
producers to overinvest in search and experience attributes as signal andlor screening 
devices rather than in the production of high credence quality itself (Kirchhoff, 2000). 
In the extreme case, consumers may believe that the production of attractive search and 
experience related attributes implies the achievement of high quality in credence 
properties as well. Such switching can be initiated by consumers' beliefs and activated 
by marketing. Producers may attempt to manipulate consumers' subjective inferences, 
raising concerns about the accuracy and regulation of such hybrid claims. From a private 
certification or government regulatory perspective, minimum quality standards may not 
adequately address related search and experience attributes or may set them at levels 
that do not correspond to those used by consumers to infer the credibility of environ- 
mental claims. 
These possibilities deserve empirical investigation, e.g., by properly designed consumer 
surveys, consumer choice experiments, or experiments. Surveys may discern to what 
extent consumers form expectations on related search and experience attributes because 
of the presence of an eco-friendly claim and how they use the degree to which their 
expectations are met as an indicator of the credibility of the eco-friendly claim. The eco- 
label design may matter especially if producers attempt to induce certain expectations. 
Consumer choice experiments could explore how different levels of search and 
experience attributes, in combination with eco-labels, affect consumer demand (see, e.g., 
Holland and Wessells, 1998). Experiments could be designed to assess how different 
levels of search and experience attributes affect demand for conventionally produced 
versus eco-labeled products. 
Our central point is that the credibility of eco-labels among consumers is influenced 
by the accompanying search and experience attributes of the labeled product. Because 
of the presence of the eco-label, consumers may expect a certain level of search and 
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experience attributes. Their subsequent evaluation of these attributes then influences 
the credibility of the environmental claim and their interest in repeat purchases of the 
product based on its environmental soundness. Honest environmental differentiation 
can fail if it does not consider the multi-dimensional character of quality perception. 
An important further step is to identify which attributes are most likely to reinforce 
the credibility of environmental claims among different market segments. While private 
and public authorities define and enforce standards for eco-labeling, only products with 
the right array of accompanying quality attributes are likely to be fully credible and 
successful in the market. Further research is necessary to analyze the possible equi- 
libria and levels of market performance that may emerge under different marketing and 
regulatory approaches to eco-labeled products. 
[Received April 2005;Jinal revision received August 2006.1 
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